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THE MEXICAN PETROLEUM COMPANY'S AMPARO
CASE*
CARLOS BERGUIDO, JR.

On November i7th last the Supreme Court of Mexico decided in favor of the company the amparo case of the Mexican
Petroleum Company against acts of the Secretary of Industry,
Commerce and Labor and of the Petroleum Agency in Tampico.
Not since the now celebrated Texas Company amparo 1 has a
decision of the Supreme Court of Mexico attracted as much
attention or been read with as great interest, both by lawyers
and laymen on either side of the Rio Grande. In view of the
importance of the present decision and of the widespread comment it has already aroused, it is our purpose to analyze the
Court's decision and to endeavor to point out its meaning and
possible effect.
We do not deem it necessary to explain fully what the
remedy of amparo is under Mexican Constitutional Law and
Practice, 2 nor do we consider it desirable or feasible to discuss
the entire petroleum question, since the adoption of the famous
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1917.8 We shall, how*The Mexican writ of amparo is a Federal writ, "the purpose whereof is to
make the supremacy of the Constitution effective over all other inferior laws,
and which, entrusted to the Federal Courts, and particularly the Supreme Court,
imposes on them the important duty of fixing and establishing the true meaning
and application of the principles of Constitutional Law and of preventing the infringement of the said principles by any one of the branches of the Federal or
State governments." Lic. Benito Flores, op. cit. infra note 2.
In the Supreme Court of Mexico, Aug. 3, 1921. Discussed in a very lucid
article by Edward Schuster, of the New York Bar, in (192) 7 A. B. A. JouRN-.,
583-589, "The Texas Company's Amparo Case." See also U. S. Daily, March
23, 1927, at 214.
'For the text of the Amparo Law, see "LEY Dn AMPARo" (Mexico i921)
with "Comentarios" by Lie. Eduardo Pallares. See also the excellent treatise
by Lic. Emilio Rabasa, "EL Juiclo CoNsTrrucloNAu" (Mexico i919). For a
brief discussion in English of the origin and operation of the remedy of amparo,
see "The Writ of Amparo under Mexican Law," by a former Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of Mexico, Lic. Benito Flores, in (1921) 7 A. B. A.
Jounx. 388-392, and the introductory remarks by Edward Schuster, of the New
York Bar, op. cit. at 583.
'For a clear exposition of some of the legal aspects of the petroleum question from the American viewpoint, see "Mexican Oil Legislation and International
Law," by Ira Jewell Williams, of the Philadelphia Bar, in (1927) 1 TEMPLE
LAW QUARTERLY 9i-i02. For a statement of the Mexican side, see "LA CUEsTx6N DEL Pma6ixo" (Mexico I92i), by Lic. Diaz Dufoo.
(287)
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ever, try to indicate how the case arose, what the contentions
of the respective parties were, both in the District Court and
in the Supreme Court, and what the Supreme Court decided.
The facts are comparatively simple. Complainant, the Mexican Petroleum Company, a California corporation, duly registered and authorized to do business in Mexico, acquired certain
lands in the former Hacienda of Chapacao, State of Vera Cruz,
prior to May I, 1917 4 and carried on there works of petroleum
exploration and exploitation. On January II, 1927, three drilling permits previously issued to the company were cancelled by
the Petroleum Agency in Tampico under express orders of the
Department of Industry, Commerce and Labor, solely on the
ground that the company had failed to comply with the new
Petroleum Law, by not applying for (so-called) "confirmatory
5
concessions" within one year from the promulgation of the law.
The Company petitioned the District Judge of Villa Cuauhtemoc,
Vera Cruz, for amparo to restrain the Petroleum Agency in
Tampico and the Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Labor
from cancelling the drilling permits and enforcing the Petroleum Law. The Company averred, inter alia, the following violations of constitutional guaranties: (i) of Article 4 of the Constitution,0 because Article 15 of the Law 7 deprives the company
of the product of its labor; (2) of Article 14 of the Constitution,8 because Article 27 of the Constitution is applied retroactively; (3) of Article 14 of the Constitution, 9 because the
cancellation of its drilling permits deprives the Company of its
The effective date of the new Mexican Constitution.
'Articles 14 and 15, Law of December 3, 1925, Diario Oficial.
No one shall be deprived of the fruit of his labor, except by
judicial decree." Art 4, Constitution of 1917.
""The confirmation of the rights to which Articles 12 and 14 of this law
refer shall be solicited within a period of one year reckoned from the date of
this law's taking effect; this period having elapsed said rights shall be considered as waived, and rights whose confirmation may not have been solicited shall
have no effect whatever as against the Federal Government." Art. 15, Law of
December 31, 1925.

'"No law shall be given retroactive effec, to the prejudice of any person
whatsoever . . " Art. 14, Constitution of 19-7.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, possessions
instituted before a duly created court, in
or rights without uue process of av,,
which the essential elements of procedure are observed and in accordance with
previously exiQ-ing laws . . ." Art. 14, Constitution of 1917.
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property, possessions and rights, without due process of law,
in that in so applying Article 15 of the Law the rights of the
Company in the subsoil, which were acquired in accordance with
previously existing laws, are ignored; (4) of Article i6 of the
Constitution,'0 because without legal cause, the Company is molested by the defendants in its possessions; (5) of Article :22 of
the Constitution," because Article 15 of the Law punishes with
confiscation those who, like the company, have not consented to
exchange their old titles for new, particularly since the complainant is a foreign company; (6) of Article 27 of the Constitution,12 in that retroactive effect is given to Articles 14 23 and 15 14
of the Law; (7) of Article 27 of the Constitution, 15 since no one
may be deprived of his property except by expropriation for
reasons of public utility and by means of indemnification.
One of the defendants, the Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Labor, in his answer set up that the drilling permits
were given merely provisionally and xpressly subject to the
Petroleum Law (when 'enacted); that the Company voluntarily
waived its rights to the subsoil by failing to apply for confirm-

.0"No

one shall be molested in his person, family, domicile, papers or pos-

sessions, except by virtue of an order in writing of the competent authority setting forth the legal ground and justification for the action taken . . ." Art.
16, Constitution of 1917.
=•
confiscation of property and any other penalties, unusual or working corruption of the blood, are prohibited." Art. 22, Constitution of 1917.
In the Nation is vested direct ownership of all minerals or substances which in veins, layers, mases, or beds constitute deposits whose nature

is different from the components of the land, such as . . . petroleum and all
hydrocarbons-solid, liquid or gaseous

.

.

."

Par. 4, Art. 27, Constitution of

1917.

3'"Without any cost, and by means of concessions granted pursuant to this
law, the following rights shall be confirmed:
I. Those that may be derived from lands on which operation of petroleum exploitation may have been commenced prior to May I, 1917.
II. Those that may be derived from contracts executed by the surface
owner or his assigns prior to May I, i917, for the express purpose

of petroleum exploitation.

The confirmation of these rights cannot be granted for more than fifty years,
reckoned from the time when exploitation work may have commenced in the

case of Section I, and, in the case of Section II, from the date when the contracts
are executed

. .

"'

Art. 14, Law of December 3, 1925.

"Supra note 7.
"Private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public
utility and by means of indemnification." Par. 2, Art. 27, Constitution of 1917.
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atory concessions, and hence could not be aggrieved by the cancellation of the drilling permits, since it had failed to comply
with the Law, upon which the permits depended for their validity; that in any event, before the Company could have any
standing in court, it had to prove the existence of its rights. The
other defendant, the Petroleum Agent in Tampico, did not
answer.
At the hearing before the District Court, the Company
offered in evidence certified copies of the deeds by which it
claimed to have acquired its rights and oral proof of its works
of exploration and exploitation prior to May i, 1917. The Dis-

trict Court granted the amparo on the ground that the Company had been deprived of its rights of exploration and exploitation to the subsoil of Chapacao without due process of law,
because under Article 27 of the Constitution, the nationalization
of petroleum must be made effective through the Courts, and
not by administrative orders.
Both defendants, the representative of the Attorney General (who is always a necessary party in amparo proceedings)
and, curiously enough, the complainant also, appealed. The
complainant was satisfied with the judgment, but apparently
thought that the decision should have gone further and been
based on other grounds. On appeal, the representative of the
Attorney General (Ministerio Publico) moved that the decision
of the lower Court be reversed, on the ground that since the
drilling permits were provisional only and subject to the provisions of the Petroleum Law, they could be cancelled if the
Company failed to comply with the Law, and, since it had voluntarily failed to apply for confirmation of any rights which it may
have had, the cancellation of the permits was lawful, without
the necessity of a suit, because for the cancellation of administrative permits no such formality is required, He also claimed
that since the Company had failed to prove its rights, the judgment of the lower Court in its favor was in error. Similarly,
defendants argued on appeal, first that the judgment was in contradiction of the reasoning on which it was based; secondly, that
the right protected was a mere expectation, rather than a vested

MEXICAN PETROLEUM COMPANY'S AMPARO CASE

291

right; thirdly, that in accordance with Article 15 of the Law,1 6
the Company's rights must be considered as waived for failure
to apply for confirmation; and fourthly, that the lower Court
had failed to consider the clause in the drilling permits making
them provisional and subject to the Petroleum Law. The Company contended that the mere requirement of Article 14 of the
Law 17 that it apply for confirmation of its pre-constitutional
rights, which can only be granted by means of a concession was
in itself a violation of the constitutional guaranties. It reasserted the other grounds for relief that we have already discussed.'
The Supreme Court convened in plenary session on November 17, 1927. At that time eleven justices ("'Magistrados") were
present: Chief Justice Diaz Lombardo, and Justices Guzm~n
Vaca, Olea, Urbina, Vicencio, Castro, Estrada, Padilla, Ramirez,
Orantes and Cisneros Canto. Justice Ramirez had prepared the
opinion of the Court. After the readirig thereof Justice Urbina
delivered a concurring opinion 19 and Chief Justice Diaz Loinbardo and Justice Cisneros Canto delivered opinions dissenting
in part. A formal vote being taken, nine Justices voted in favor
of the opinion as read. Chief Justice Diaz Lombardo and Justice Cisneros Canto dissented in part, but both concurred in
granting. amparo. The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision
of the District Court (without concurring in the reasoning
thtureof), issued the- following order:
"The Justice of the Union shelters and protects the
Mexican Petroleum Company of California against the acts
of which it complains consisting in the revocation of the
permits granted by the Secretary of Industry, Commerce
and Labor, to drill wells, 'Mendez No. 27,' 'Chijol No. 63'
and 'Dicha No. lO4,' in the lands of the former Hacienda of
"Supra note 7.
' TSupra note 13.
1 Supra notes 6 to 15.
This opinion avowedly concerns itself, not with legalistic principles, but
with the economic, social and political aspects of the petroleum question. It is
perhaps indicative of the views of the Administration and was probably inspired.
Sed quaere, would not this be true also of the majority opinion?
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Chapacao, Municipality of Panuco, State of Vera Cruz,
basing such revocation on Articles 14 and 15 of the Petroleum Law, regulating Article 27 of the Federal Constitution, and applying the sanction established by the said
Article 15."
The decision of the Court, in accordance with Mexican
practice, is divided into three parts: The "Resulting" clauses
("Resultandos"), in which the Court reviews the facts as developed in the pleadings, as well as the legal arguments advanced
by the respective parties in the Court below, then the "Considering" clauses ("Considerandos"), in which the legal basis of
the Court's decision is set. forth, and finally the Judgment itself
("Puntos Resolutivos"). 2 0 In the consideranda the Court takes
up the contending arguments: first of the defendants, then of the
Attorney General, and finally of the complainant. But, as
pointed out in the dissenting opinion by Justice Cisneros Canto,
the Court does not even attempt to answer all the points presented by the parties. It finds that defendant's argument that
the decision of the lower Court is contradictory is without merit,
because even if there were contradiction-which is not conceded-the decision below rests on solid constitutional grounds,
the violation of Articles 14,21 16

and 2728 of the Constitu-

tion. The second point raised by defendants is also found without merit. Says the Court:
"It is not true that a mere expectation of rights is involved, because, in addition to the fact that the District
Judge only referred to the rights of exploration and exploitation granted to the complainant, those rights exist,
not in prospect, but by virtue of the works that the complainant has carried out with the respective permits and
under the protection of general laws previously eniacted,
and, at least for that reason, a mere expectancy is not involved

.

The majority opinion quoted supra p. 291.
' Supra notes 8 and 9.
"Supra note io.
' Supra note 12.
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The real meat of the whole case, its ratio decidendi, is found
in the following language overruling defendant's third point: 24
"Consequently, if the complainant company could not
apply for the confirmation of its pre-existing rights, except
with a limitation as to time in regard thereto, it is beyond
doubt that it was indispensable that such a restriction should
first disappear, and therefore, the term of one year established therefor by Article 15 could not run, in view of the
impossibility to which reference has been made; and since
the Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Labor, in violation of the principles previously expressed, cancelled the
permits granted to the complainant company, relying on the
lapse of the said term, without taking in consideration the
unconstitutionality of the 5o-year limitation, a necessary
condition for confirmation, it is undisputable that the decision complained of violates in this respect the guaranties
which are granted in favor of complainant by Articles 14,
16 and 27 of the Federal Constitution."
To the fourth of defendant's points the Court answers that
the District Judge did consider the fact that the permits were
merely provisional and subject to the Petroleum Law, but, although provisional, they were based on some of the rights enumerated by Article 14 of the Law. Having answered the first
argument of the Attorney General in disposing of defendant's
thf.d point, the Court then takes up the other contention that
the Company had failed to prove its rights. The Court holds
that an amparo suit is not the proper proceeding in which to
establish property rights,2 5 and that insofar as the rights of the
Company are concerned, there has been as yet no opportunity to
prove them because "'the examination of such rights must be
made when the application for confirmation is presented to the
Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Labor." In other words,
until an opportunity is given to the company to prove its rights
fully in appropriate proceedings, the prima facie case it made
'SUpra p. 291.

This is in accordance with Article io7 of the Constitution of 1917 and
Article 2 of the Amparo Law of Iqg9.

294

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

out in the District Court is sufficient for the purposes of the
Amparo Law.
The Court does not answer what seems like a very sound
argument advanced by the Company, namely that simply requiring it to apply for a concession in exchange for its old titles is
in itself a violation of the constitutional guaranties, particularly
in view 'of the fact that the company is a foreign company and
thus under the Constitution 20 and the Petroleum Law 27 it would
seem that the Company cannot lawfully receive any concession.
Justice Cisneros Canto, in his dissenting opinion, answers this
with Article 159 of the Regulations of the Petroleum Law. 8
But can the express language of the Constitution and the Law
be enlarged by mere Regulations?
The opinion then goes on to state that Article 14 of the Law
requires a mere confirmation of pre-existing rights and hence
cannot violate any precepts of the Constitution; that those preconstitutional rights could not be confirmed automatically by
operations of law, because this would result in confusion, while
a manifestation of such rights for the purpose of confirmation
would enable the Government to issue the necessary police regulations. A parallel is sought to be found in the Law of Federal
Waters,2 1 but the Court seems to overlook the'fact that under the
terms of that law, pre-existing rights were automatically confirmed "by virtue of the law" 8 and "respected and confirmed." -,
Having analyzed rather fully the Court's decision, let us
now ascertain concretely what the decision holds. In short:
Article 27, supra note 12.

"Mexicans and civil and commercial companies organized under the laws
of Mexico may obtain petroleum concessions subject to the precepts of this law.
In addition to the foregoing limitation, aliens must previously comply with the
requirements of Article 27 of the Political Constitution in force." Art. 4, Law
of December 31, 1925.
' "For the effects of Article 4 of the Law, should the holder of the rights
recognized in Articles 12 and 14 of said Law and 157 of these Regulations be a
foreign company or a Mexican company with foreign shareholders, said rights
may be retained by such company . . . for so long as the contracts from
which they emanate may be in force, or, as the case may be, for the time of duration of the company, according to its articles of association!" Art. i59, Regulations, "Diario Oficial," April 8, 1926.
' Law of December 14, 1910.

'0 Article 31, Law of December 14, 1910.
"Article 32, Law of December 14, 1910.
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That the 5o-year limitation on petroleum concessions
established by Article 14 of the Petroleum Law is unconstitutional.
(2) That, consequently, the one-year period of grace from
the promulgation of the Law contained in Article 15 of the Law
is void, and that the failure so to apply within the year cannot
be considered as a waiver of certain pre-constitutional subsoil
rights.
(3) That the rights which the Court protects relate to lands
(a) acquired in fee prior to 1917 and (b) on which regular
works of petroleum exploitation have been carried on prior to
that date. In other words, this is an affirmation of the doctrine
32
of positive acts announced in the Texas Company amparo
and reiterated by the Mexican Commissioners at the formal
meeting of August 2, 19 2 3 . 33
(4) That the examination of pre-constitutional titles is to
be made administratively by the Department of Industry, Commerce and Labor.
(5) That the nationalization of petroleum is generally confirmed and approved.
(6) That it is left in doubt how the "confirmation" of preconstitutional rights is to be made-apparently by means of
((concessions." 34
(7) That it is also left in doubt how the pre-constitutional
rights of a foreign company may be "confirmed."
(8) That in order to obtain a confirmation of pre-constitutional rights, the holders thereof must, in addition, prove compliance "with the obligations contained in the respective titles."
(i)

. The Press of the United States seems to have received the
decision with universal praise and acclaim, 35 but it is evident that
"See supra note i.
"See "Proceedings of the United States-Mexican Commission," p. 47. It
will be noticed that the number of "positive acts" recognized in Article 14 of the
Law and in this decision is greatly curtailed, particularly in the case of lands
held in fee.
" So the Constitution (Article 27) and the Law (Articles 2, 4 and 14)
would indicate.
" See "Our Oil Victory in Mexico," The Literary Digest, December io, 1927.
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while the decision undoubtedly points the way to a solution of
the Petroleum Queston, it is far from fulfillng the legitimate.
aspirations of the Oil Industry, or from meeting the just demands of our State Department. 6 Before a complete and lasting settlement of the controversy may be hoped for certain legislative and even constitutional changes must be adopted, looking
forward to the "true confirmation of pre-existing titles in their
entirety." 11 Until this is done, the development of the great
natural resources in the subsoil of Mexico will continue to be
handicapped and hindered, and ",e further investment of foreign
capital will be discouraged.
Let us hope that this decision may be the beginning of an
era- of better understanding between this country and Mexico,
and the precursor of a stream of judicial decisions, followed by
remedial legislation and an enlightened administrative policy
which will inure to the lasting credit and continued prosperity
of our great neighbor to the South.
' See "Correspondence Between the Governments of the United States and
Mexico," as released for publication by the Department of State, November 24,
I926 (Reprint by Association of Producers of Petroleum in Mexico) and references on backcover page thereof.
'Note of the Secretary of State to the Mexican Minister for Foreign
Affairs, dated July 31, 1926, Reprint, p. 12.

